Sept. 25, 2026 | Sign up + past editions | Unsubscribe
An $18-million bill is the latest RTO chatter. But here’s a more esoteric question: what does early retirement do to a public service trying to change how it works?
The Carney government’s early-retirement incentive drew out thousands of public servants from a generation that came of age inside the rules, processes and oversight the government now says have made the public service too slow, risk-averse and cautious.
Now, this could be exactly what the government wants. It could also be exactly what the government can least afford to lose.
Both can be true. And probably are.
These early retirees are taking experience, corporate memory and operational knowledge with them. They could also be taking some of the caution and old thinking that came climbing the ranks in a play-it-safe culture of rules and controls that flourished in the 25 years after Canada’s 1995 fiscal crisis.
The government wants a public service that moves faster and is willing to take risks. Its clearest move yet is the creation of Digital Transformation Canada, with a big mandate: modernize how government develops, buys and uses technology, changing not just the technology but the nature of the work and how public servants operate.
Today:
Pitfall-spotting: Do it pre-policy, not post-.
Blame the triangle: Doug Guzman’s note to staff.
Next-level goals: Patrick Pichette’s note to staff.
Straight to industry: Where a wave of bureaucrats is going.
Start killing things: Amanda Clarke’s advice for DTC.
ERI EXITS
The generation they’re losing
About 69,000 public servants qualified for the Early Retirement Incentive. Fewer than 14 per cent of those applied and fewer than one per cent of applicants were denied.
But knowing how many are leaving doesn’t really tell us what skills the government is losing or where. So far, the Treasury Board Secretariat has released little to reveal the full impact.
Many came into government after the 1995 Program Review cuts, when there was little hiring or spending. A modernization act followed, loosening staffing rules and giving managers more hiring power. Then came the sponsorship scandal, the Gomery inquiry and the Federal Accountability Act.
They cut their teeth on ever-piling rules, processes and new watchdogs. Their careers unfolded through rapid technological change, tighter controls, the 2008 financial crisis, the growing influence of political staff and further centralization of power in the Prime Minister’s Office.
All of it could help explain why so many became timid, process-driven and risk-averse.
A financial bureaucrat who joined in 1998 said years of restraint gave his generation of public servants a “muscle memory” for doing policy without money, a skill some argue is needed today.
He was profoundly shaped by years of austerity: the Chrétien-era downsizing emptied offices. He was told then that fewer than 100 people were hired the year he was. Then came Paul Martin’s 2004 budget, Harper-era restraint and the cuts of 2012.
This is also the system that has produced people who know the machinery of government inside out. They know how to navigate complexity, whether dealing with the crises of the day or stickhandling a program to approval: they know the obstacles, which rules apply, who needs to sign off, how to manage central agencies and protect their ministers.
Those are the kind of people who need to be brought in before a policy is approved, say two former Treasury Board secretaries, Peter Wallace and Graham Flack.
Delivery and implementation are big weak spots in government, and implementation should be considered from the start, the pair argue in a recent paper.